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BRAIN DRAIN TAXATION AS DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
YARIV BRAUNER* 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines the potential use of taxation to generate development 
funds in connection with the immigration of skilled immigrants from 
developing to developed countries, known as the “brain drain,” if designed 
according to the principles of the new development agenda.  It explains that a 
tax on the brain drain that has been discussed for several decades, yet 
considered impossible to administer, may be administratively and legally 
implementable within the framework of the current international tax regime.  It 
argues that designing such a tax according to the principles of the new 
development agenda, tying together the collection and use of the revenue 
functions, is essential for the tax to be justifiable and effective.  The article 
proceeds to set the parameters for its design. 
  
 
* Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law.  I thank Sarah Zuckerman 
Collins and Meytal Albo for their assistance, and the participants in the Saint Louis University 
Law Journal’s Sanford E. Sarasohn Memorial Conference on Critical Issues in International & 
Comparative Taxation, in the Washburn University School of Law’s tax workshop, and a 
University of Florida Levin College of Law faculty workshop for their useful comments.  All 
mistakes or inaccuracies are mine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Times of crisis tend to shift the focus from progressive policies to survival.  
It is only natural that the development discourse has attracted less attention 
lately.  This is bad news for developing countries that depend on cooperation 
with the developed world and international institutions for support in their 
quest for growth and development, and they may suffer from the international 
economic crisis even more than developed countries.1  The likely consequence 
is a further widening of the already-increasing gap between developed and 
developing countries.2  At the same time, using taxation as a policy tool is very 
unpopular in these times.  For example, the current United States 
administration has been reluctant to increase taxation extensively, despite an 
unprecedented need for revenue.3 
Against this unpromising background, this article explores the possibility 
and merit of using tax measures to promote development.  It adds to the 
growing scholarship, evaluating the use of taxation as a tool in the arsenal of 
development policy measures, an analysis of the taxation of the emigration of 
skilled workers from developing to developed countries, a phenomenon 
commonly known as the “brain drain.”4  Specifically, this article examines the 
use of tax measures to generate development funds, collected in connection 
with the brain drain and designed according to the principles of the new 
development agenda.  This new development agenda emerged out of the 
critique of the consistent—yet failing—agenda of the international institutions 
that dominate development policies today, which focus on centralized planning 
 
 1. See, e.g., Bruno Gurtner, The Financial and Economic Crisis and Developing Countries, 
in ANNUAL REVIEW: MAJOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY TRENDS 189, 190 (Int’l Dev. Policy Ser. 
No. 2, 2010) (discussing how the financial crisis that began in the United States in 2008 has 
particularly impacted developing nations). 
 2. See ELHANAN HELPMAN, THE MYSTERY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 2 (2004) (stating the 
gap between rich and poor countries continues to grow).  See generally NATHAN ROSENBERG & 
L.E. BIRDZELL, JR., HOW THE WEST GREW RICH: THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL WORLD (1986) (arguing that Third World countries should not expect favorable 
results by imitating Western economic systems due to differences in the history of the West and 
the Third World). 
 3. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/115xx/doc11579/06-30-LTBO.pdf (outlining the dismal revenue 
outlook if Bush-era tax cuts remain effective but noting that increasing taxes during this 
economic downturn is unappealing).  The current administration’s hesitation to increase taxes, at 
least partly, is due to President Obama’s campaign pledge not to raise taxes.  Responsible Tax 
Cuts for Ordinary Americans, BARACKOBAMA.COM, http://www.barackobama.com/taxes/ (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2011). 
 4. The term originated from British Royal Society reports describing skilled-worker 
immigration from the United Kingdom to the United States and Canada.  See Brian Balmer et al., 
The Royal Society and the ‘Brain Drain’: Natural Scientists Meet Social Science, 63 NOTES & 
REC. ROYAL SOC’Y 339, 346 (2009) (attributing the phrase to The Evening Standard). 
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and increasing the volume of aid.5  Alternatively, the new agenda calls for a 
decentralized, localized, entrepreneurial, trial-and-error approach that works 
better in the development context.6  Accordingly, the measures discussed in 
this article are designed to both raise the development funds and spend them 
appropriately and effectively.  A fundamental premise is that, while possible, 
independent analyses of resource collection and allocation of the proceeds 
would be improper, because such analyses would likely fall into the wasteful 
pattern of past policies. 
This article reformulates and embeds into the new development agenda a 
tax on the brain drain, which Professor Jagdish Bhagwati envisioned almost 
forty years ago.7  Similar to the proposal in this article, the goal of the 
Bhagwati tax was to assist developing countries in their quest for growth, and 
its policy was motivated primarily by fairness.8  The success of such a tax can 
be measured solely by its effectiveness in promoting growth and development.  
Specifically, the tax neither aims to efficiently compensate developing 
countries for their brain drain, nor does it promise economic neutrality.  In this 
way, the proposal is essentially independent of the economic debate over 
whether the brain drain is harmful or beneficial to the “sending” developing 
countries.  The benefit of making the brain drain the subject of the tax is that it 
makes the tax potentially more palatable to the developed countries (whose 
cooperation is necessary for the proposal’s success) since it is generally 
perceived as just.  For this reason, it is important to understand the brain drain 
phenomenon and its real effects, economic and otherwise, on both the sending 
(developing) and host (developed) countries.  Part I undertakes this task by 
reviewing what we know about the brain drain’s effect on the relevant 
countries.  By now, a quite large body of studies has attempted to overcome a 
chronic shortage of data and low-quality data.  These studies concluded that 
there are both positive and negative consequences of the brain drain 
phenomenon and that such consequences vary depending on the circumstances, 
the countries involved, and over time.9  The least developed countries, 
 
 5. See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002) 
(arguing globalization policies of international economic institutions like the IMF and World 
Bank have served industrialized countries’ interests and have hurt the world’s poor). 
 6. See, e.g., WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S 
EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND SO LITTLE GOOD (2006) (discussing 
how recent “success story” nations have been those who accepted relatively little foreign aid, and 
recent “disaster” nations have received a lot of foreign aid and IMF attention). 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
 9. See, e.g., DEVESH KAPUR & JOHN MCHALE, GIVE US YOUR BEST AND YOUR 
BRIGHTEST: THE GLOBAL HUNT FOR TALENT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WORLD 1–2 (2005); 
Simon Commander et al., The Brain Drain: Curse or Boon? A Survey of the Literature, in 
CHALLENGES TO GLOBALIZATION: ANALYZING THE ECONOMICS 235, 237 (Robert E. Baldwin & 
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however, seem to consistently fall on the losing side, an outcome that calls for 
action if one cares about the increasing gap between the developed and 
developing world.10  A basic assumption of this article is that developed 
countries do generally care about the gap, as they spend significant capital on 
foreign aid and other development initiatives.11  The brain drain tax discussed 
in this article, although clearly not a cure-all measure, may be one step in the 
right direction. 
Part II discusses the design challenges the proposed tax measures face, 
focusing on the collectability of the tax.  It traces the evolution of the Bhagwati 
tax proposal and the design challenges it faced, some of which were a 
consequence of the lack of isolation of the proposal from the economic 
background of the brain drain phenomenon.  Consequently, although the 
proposal has been extensively discussed over the years, mainly in economics 
circles,12 it has not materialized into an operative tool, let alone an actual tax.13  
Political and legal constraints probably have been to blame for this, yet there is 
a long list of challenges to the Bhagwati proposal, with little support beyond 
academic literature.  This article suggests that, contrary to common perception, 
these challenges may be overcome, even within the legal framework of the 
existing international tax regime.  The paper argues this, however, while also 
integrating the tax with the new development agenda.14  This suggestion results 
from the observation that if one cares about development, it is insufficient to 
merely design a mechanism to allocate funds for development efforts; it is also 
imperative to design a mechanism for the use of the collected funds. 
Part III develops this observation.  It places the Bhagwati proposal in the 
context of the new development agenda, focusing on the use of funds collected 
by the tax.  This agenda rejects the currently dominant agenda, strongly 
enforced by the international institutions, based on centralized and uniform 
 
L. Alan Winters eds., 2004); Pierpaolo Giannoccolo, The Brain Drain: A Survey of the Literature 
9 (Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Dep’t of Statistics, Working Paper No. 2006-03-02, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1374329. 
 10. See HELPMAN, supra note 2, at 86; KAPUR & MCHALE, supra note 9, at 17–20. 
 11. Developed countries spend a lot of money on international development, which indicates 
at least that they view it as in their interest.  See, e.g., DEV. CO-OPERATION DIRECTORATE, ORG. 
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., DEVELOPMENT AT A GLANCE: STATISTICS BY REGION 2 
(2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/5/42139479.pdf. 
 12. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 13. The Philippines briefly imposed a citizenship-based tax targeted at its emigrants but was 
not able to enforce it.  Of course, this tax did not follow the Bhagwati proposal that suggested a 
surtax be imposed by the host (developed) countries to benefit the sending countries, such as the 
Philippines.  Richard D. Pomp, The Experience of the Philippines in Taxing its Nonresident 
Citizens, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 245 (1985), reprinted in INCOME TAXATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY 43, 47, 49 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & John Douglas Wilson eds., 1989). 
 14. See infra Part III. 
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(“grand”) planning and the “Washington Consensus”15 version of market 
theory.  This current development agenda emphasizes the need for aid and 
consistently argues that the more aid, the better, practically imposing one-size-
fits-all policy instruments on its subjects (the developing countries).16  This 
dominant policy has not been seriously challenged despite its recurring, 
miserable failure over the years.  Failure generated merely “new” grand plans 
that failed again and again.  What is called here the “new development agenda” 
is a growing body of contemporary scholarship that not only challenges the 
content of the plans, but the entire approach.17  It calls for support of what 
works and what may be studied and assessed based on verifiable data.  Studies 
demonstrate that local, smaller-scale, entrepreneurial, focused projects work 
better than grand plans, and therefore, the new development agenda supports a 
trial-and-error approach: projects designed with clear goals whose success may 
be assessed and hopefully measured, focusing on local needs and initiatives, 
and most importantly, building on success gradually, if potentially slowly due 
to lesser political appeal.18 
The potential role of taxation in the new development agenda has yet to be 
developed, but its basic premises may be helpful for the purposes of this 
article.  Taxation naturally fits the complexity and nuanced characteristic of the 
brain drain phenomenon and its effect on developing and developed countries, 
explored in Part II.  The new development agenda relates most directly to the 
question of what to do with the money raised by the brain drain tax and who 
will make the relevant decisions.  Yet this new agenda also is relevant to some 
decisions regarding the design of the tax itself, primarily the question of who 
collects the tax and in what manner.   
Part IV concludes with some additional observations about alternatives or 
complementary tax measures to a brain drain tax, such as exit taxes, revenue 
sharing for development, and tax incentives designed to support return citizens, 
remittances, academic “visits,” and other scientific cooperation.  This article 
 
 15. The term “Washington Consensus” was coined by John Williamson in a 1989 summary 
of ten key development advice items commonly shared by three Washington, D.C. institutions—
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United States Treasury Department.  
The original context was advice to Latin American countries following the 1980s crisis.  See John 
Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: 
HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED 7, 7 (John Williamson ed., 1990).  This advice later became the 
symbol of what is often called market fundamentalism.  See Steven A. Ramirez, Market 
Fundamentalism’s New Fiasco: Globalization as Exhibit B in the Case for a New Law and 
Economics, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 831, 835 (2003) (reviewing STIGLITZ, supra note 5). 
 16. See generally STIGLITZ, supra note 5 (discussing failures of the market fundamentalism 
approach). 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See, e.g., EASTERLY, supra note 6. 
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also suggests supporting the communication infrastructure in developing 
countries to negate brain drain. 
I.  SO, WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE “BRAIN DRAIN”? 
The brain drain phenomenon has attracted the attention of researchers, 
particularly economists, as far back as the middle of the last century, when 
circumstances allowed for increased mobility of labor and particularly, skilled 
labor from developing to developed countries.19  During the 1990s, the opening 
of economies and borders, together with the dramatic decrease in 
transportation and communication costs due to globalization, led to an increase 
in the brain drain, mostly into developed countries that implemented special 
programs to attract skilled migration.20  The increase also revived an interest in 
both the empirical and theoretical economic studies of this phenomenon.21  
This section discusses the brain drain phenomenon, what we know about it, its 
evolution over time, and its effect on the countries and people involved. 
 
 19. For an interesting and concise review of the history of the study of the brain drain, see 
generally Giannoccolo, supra note 9.  The brain drain in its modern form began in the 1970s, and 
this is when we begin to see early modern studies of the phenomenon.  Id. at 6–7.  Skilled 
immigration was, of course, important to some countries even prior to World War II and, 
naturally, during and after the war.  Id. at 4–5.  The focus of the study of brain drain in the 1950s 
was the emigration from the United Kingdom to the United States.  Id. at 5, 10.  This immigration 
was thought to be socially and politically motivated.  Id. at 5.  Its effect was presumed to be 
harmful to the welfare of the United Kingdom constituency, its society, and demographics.  Id. at 
5–6. 
 20. Simon Commander et al., The Brain Drain: A Review of Theory and Facts, 47 
BRUSSELS ECON. REV. 29, 41 (2004).  See also KAPUR & MCHALE, supra note 9, at 37–38, 70–
72 (finding developed countries are increasingly competing for skilled labor and can offer greater 
benefits to immigrating workers who are consequently willing to emigrate); Commander et al., 
supra note 9, at 236 (finding that labor “poaching” by developed countries has increased over the 
last decade due to greater need for technically skilled workers and that the emigration of skilled 
labor from developing countries may have positive effects). 
 21. See Giannoccolo, supra note 9, at 8–9 (listing numerous studies published after 1990).  
A complication of this renewed interest is that the evolving literature deals with consequences 
that change over time, so to some extent, not only due to new observations that were not 
uncovered by earlier studies, but also possibly due to changes in the phenomenon itself.  In 
addition, we now have more data about brain drain than in prior decades.  The most recent data 
show very high rates of skilled emigration from some of the poorest countries and smaller rates 
from countries with emerging economies (such as China, India, and Brazil), although these 
countries provide the largest aggregate numbers of skilled emigrants to developed countries.  See 
Commander et al., supra note 9, at 238, 239 tbl.7.1. 
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A. The Effect of Skilled Immigration on Developing Countries 
1. From Brain Drain to Brain Gain? 
The early modern study of the phenomenon of skilled workers’ emigration 
from developing to developed countries focused on what was called the 
“sending” (i.e., the developing) countries.22  The initial hypotheses were that 
this migration harms the sending countries and negatively affects their quest 
for growth and development: hence, brain “drain.”23  More recent economic 
literature tells a more complex and nuanced story, demonstrating that skilled 
worker emigration may have both positive and negative effects on the sending 
countries.24  Consequently, a student of the brain drain must evaluate the 
magnitude of the phenomenon’s effects on sending countries, in order to make 
informed policy judgments.  Unfortunately, uncertainty exists regarding these 
relative magnitudes, and the data is generally both insufficient and 
qualitatively poor.25  Therefore, it is difficult to establish widely supportable 
policies on them.  For the purposes of this paper, however, this is not an 
insurmountable obstacle, since as already mentioned, its proposal, similar to 
the Bhagwati tax, does not require proof of the harm suffered by developing 
countries or extent of such harm, if any.  Nonetheless, an understanding of the 
phenomenon is useful, primarily for the purpose of ensuring the legitimacy and 
the effectiveness of this proposal. 
A basic economic model used in the early studies of brain drain was 
formalized by Jagdish Bhagwati and Koichi Hamada.26  A basic assumption of 
 
 22. See Giannoccolo, supra note 9, at 6–7.  This focus on the developing-developed gap 
(sometimes called the North-South clash) began in the 1960s and 1970s; during this period most 
policy responses to the presumed brain-drain harm were devised, including the Bhagwati tax.  Id. 
See also Commander et al., supra note 9, at 235 (explaining the expanded usage of the term 
“brain drain” in the 1960s). 
 23. Commander et al., supra note 9, at 235; Giannoccolo, supra note 9, at 5–7 (summarizing 
the early studies). 
 24. See KAPUR & MCHALE, supra note 9, at 4 (positing that the brain drain actually helped 
Indian, Irish, and Chinese economies by facilitating international business); Commander et al., 
supra note 9, at 236 (noting that skilled emigration can benefit sending countries by increasing 
human capital, providing resources through remittance, and increasing the flow of information); 
Giannoccolo, supra note 9, at 8–9 (summarizing theoretical papers which hypothecated that by 
creating a market for skilled workers, the brain drain could increase the average education of 
persons remaining in the developing country). 
 25. See KAPUR & MCHALE, supra note 9, at 11 (“The data on international migration are so 
poor that it is difficult to estimate simple migrant stocks and flows, let alone their human capital 
content.”); Commander et al., supra note 9, at 237. 
 26. See generally Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Koichi Hamada, Domestic Distortions, Imperfect 
Information and the Brain Drain, 2 J. DEV. ECON. 265 (1975) (extending Bhagwati and 
Hamada’s previous model to incorporate overqualification, internal labor diffusion, imperfect 
information on labor quality, and the resulting welfare effects of the brain drain); Jagdish N. 
Bhagwati & Koichi Hamada, The Brain Drain, International Integration of Markets for 
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this model (supported by evidence) was that skilled immigrants significantly 
increased their wages (in purchase power terms) upon immigration.27  The 
brain drain consequently reduced skilled unemployment and increased wages 
in the sending developing countries, which in turn, presumably increased 
unemployment for both skilled and unskilled employees in such countries.28  
The loss of skilled workers in developing countries was particularly 
devastating, since they had so few of them to begin with, and the skilled 
workers’ absence limited investment and growth that depend on such 
workers.29  This also affected the employment of unskilled workers that was 
complementary to the employment and existence of skilled workers.30  The 
Bhagwati-Hamada model formally demonstrated the negative effect of the 
brain drain on the sending developing countries, an effect that was instinctively 
assumed, but that had not been demonstrated prior to their study.31  Critics of 
early brain drain literature note the model’s simplicity, dearth of empirical 
support, failure to look at any variables other than “skilled” versus “unskilled,” 
and the need for differentiating between sectors and countries.32 
A different argument against the brain drain was that developing countries 
lost their sunk investment in the education of the skilled workers who 
emigrated.33  This loss was exacerbated by the assumption that those who 
emigrated were the most highly skilled workers.34  More recent observers 
argued in response that governments are indeed still the primary financers of 
education in developing countries, but at least in the less-regulated sectors, 
private education has increased significantly since the 1980s in some 
countries.35  This trend toward private institutions reduces the power of the 
argument that the developing country loses money via lost educational 
 
Professionals and Unemployment: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. DEV. ECON. 19 (1974) (outlining 
an alternative value-theoretic model for studying the brain drain). 
 27. Commander et al., supra note 20, at 32. 
 28. Id. at 31–32. 
 29. See KAPUR & MCHALE, supra note 9, at 27 (describing the emigration of health care 
workers from developing nations and the resulting exacerbation of already-existing shortages and 
deterioration of the quality of the care); AnnaLee Saxenian, From Brain Drain to Brain 
Circulation: Transnational Communities and Regional Upgrading in India and China, STUD. 
COMP. INT’L DEV., Summer 2005, at 35, 36 (noting brain drain can be a constraint on future 
economic progress in developing countries). 
 30. Commander et al., supra note 20, at 31–32. 
 31. Id. at 30. 
 32. See, e.g., id. at 33. 
 33. Id. at 32–33. 
 34. Andrew Mountford, Can a Brain Drain Be Good for Growth in the Source Economy?, 
53 J. DEV. ECON. 287, 288 (1997). 
 35. See Commander et al., supra note 20, at 33 (discussing the expansion of private 
education in China since the 1980s, but noting this expansion has not impacted more tightly 
regulated sectors, where education continues to be primarily funded in the government). 
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investment in emigrants, at least in some cases.36  The argument that the “best 
and brightest” emigrate seems obvious at first glance, since developed 
countries that compete for skilled immigrants can—and do—select them from 
the pool of available talent.  It is not always clear, however, that indeed the 
very best and brightest leave.37  This is because the selecting countries may not 
have complete information to allow them to make the best choices in all 
cases.38  Moreover, there are many reasons why skilled workers decide to 
emigrate, so some of them may be more motivated than others, and that may 
affect, rightfully or not, the selection process.  What we do know is that in 
some fields and particularly when a certain skills set is concerned—notably 
medical doctors and nurses—the loss is often devastating.39 
Scholars criticized these two general arguments—that skilled labor became 
scarce in developing countries and that developing countries lost educational 
investment in the best and brightest—as proof that brain drain was bad for 
developing countries.  The most important of these critiques was that the 
earlier literature as a whole did not account for potential positive effects of 
brain drain.40  The weaknesses of the earlier studies may have existed partly 
because some positive effects of emigration on developing nations did not 
become pronounced until later in time.  For example, returning skilled 
immigrants bring developed world skills and knowledge back to their sending 
developing countries, yet it is impossible to understand the effect of their 
return until it occurs, it is studied, and it is measured.41  Nonetheless, what is 
clear is that the original assumptions regarding brain drain lacked nuance, and 
new scholarship evolved to correct this weakness. 
In the 1980s, scholars (notably Paul Romer) developed the new growth 
theory, emphasizing the importance of knowledge and technology to economic 
growth.42  Most importantly, this theory explained that governments may affect 
their markets’ technological position by policy means and thereby improve 
their chances for economic growth.43  This observation is particularly relevant 
 
 36. See id. at 33 (describing the influx of private education into India and China).  Note, 
however, that this is likely not the case in the weakest affected countries. 
 37. See KAPUR & MCHALE, supra note 9, at 16–17. 
 38. Commander et al., supra note 20, at 34–35. 
 39. See, e.g., id. at 25–29 (discussing the effects of the medical brain drain in particular). 
 40. These weaknesses were addressed by later scholarly works.  See Giannoccolo, supra 
note 9, at 8–9. 
 41. See id. at 31–33 (listing enrollments of foreign students in the United States and debating 
the number that would eventually return to their country of origin). 
 42. See Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71, S72 
(1990). 
 43. Id. at S99.  For a less-technical review of the new growth theory, see generally DAVID 
WARSH, KNOWLEDGE AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: A STORY OF ECONOMIC DISCOVERY 
(2006). 
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to this article.  By being skilled and, more often than not, technologically 
skilled, immigrants were particularly important to the economic growth of their 
host developed countries.44  Naturally, they did not contribute to their home 
countries’ economic growth since they were absent.  Yet, one must be careful 
before concluding that they harmed the growth potential of their home 
countries because it is possible that other factors would have impeded growth 
regardless of the brain drain.45  One should also be careful not to 
overemphasize the contributions of skilled immigrants to the host countries in 
this regard without careful study of the phenomenon, since the data does not 
always reflect, in isolation, the technological advantage brought to the hosting 
developed countries by skilled immigrants from developing countries.  
Nevertheless, the gap between developing and developed countries continued 
to widen.46  Because the gap may be partly explained by the brain drain, it was 
therefore, from a development perspective, a potential negative consequence of 
this phenomenon.  This continuing gap attracted further study and correction of 
some of the deficiencies of the earlier literature. 
The most recent study is dynamic and also acknowledges the incentives 
that the brain drain created and not only the harm or potential harm it causes to 
the sending developing countries.47  The brain drain’s most important positive 
effect (which brings into question the “drain” description) is the incentive it 
creates for workers in developing nations to obtain an education and acquire 
skills desired in developing countries.48  The argument is that absent the 
opportunity to migrate, too few workers in developing countries would acquire 
skills because the return on education investment is low in their home 
countries.49  The opportunities are few and productivity is low, resulting in 
relatively low wages.50  In contrast, productivity in developed countries is 
high, and there is an increasing demand for skilled workers that result in higher 
 
 44. Giannoccolo, supra note 9, at 4. 
 45. The discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this article. 
 46. See, e.g., ANGUS MADDISON, THE WORLD ECONOMY: A MILLENNIAL PERSPECTIVE 17 
(2001).  For additional statistics, see also The World Economy, ORG. FOR ECON. DEV. & CO-
OPERATION, http://www.theworldeconomy.org/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).  See also PAUL 
COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND WHAT CAN 
BE DONE ABOUT IT 2–13 (2007). 
 47. Michel Beine et al., Brain Drain and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence, 64 J. 
DEV. ECON. 275 (2001). 
 48. Id. at 287.  Note that the authors do not argue, however, that brain gain outweighs brain 
drain. 
 49. Id. at 276. 
 50. See Commander et al., supra note 20, at 32 (noting that skilled workers earn less in 
developing countries); Giannoccolo, supra note 9, at 7 (noting the main motivation for emigration 
was the market’s inability to employ highly-skilled workers). 
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wages in real (purchase parity) terms.51  The opportunity to migrate 
incentivizes more people to acquire skills than the developed world can 
absorb.52  Consequently, developing countries may end up with more—rather 
than fewer—skilled workers, which may result in improved—rather than 
depressed—economic growth due to the brain drain phenomenon.53  Of course 
this can happen only if some of those who acquire skills do not emigrate (this 
is reasonable because it is difficult for developed countries’ firms to effectively 
assess this ex ante).54  This argument was at the heart of what was called the 
“brain gain” literature that implied skilled immigration may even result in a net 
benefit to the sending developing countries.55 
The brain gain literature sparked strong reactions from scholars, energizing 
the debate over the brain drain.  Some scholars are still skeptical of the 
importance of the brain gain argument and attempt to demonstrate that even if 
the brain drain has some positive effects on some sending countries, these 
effects are very small, and therefore do not negate the overall harm that the 
brain drain causes such countries.56  Some explain that it is the weakest 
countries that are most affected by brain drain, and they suffer most from its 
negative effects while enjoying little or no brain gain.57  Proponents of the 
brain gain, however, added some empirical and theoretical support to their 
argument.58  Much of the debate surrounds methodological and quality data 
 
 51. See Giannoccolo, supra note 9, at 8 (noting the motivation for emigration was the higher 
productivity and associated higher wages in developed countries). 
 52. See Beine et al., supra note 47, at 276. 
 53. Id. at 287.  For further study, see Andrew Mountford, supra note 34 (exploring limited 
exit visas and how limiting migration may be good for developing nations); Oded Stark et al., A 
Brain Gain with a Brain Drain, 55 ECON. LETTERS 227 (1997) (comparing human capital in 
developing countries with open versus closed out migration); Oded Stark et al., Human Capital 
Depletion, Human Capital Formation, and Migration: A Blessing or a “Curse”?, 60 ECON. 
LETTERS 363 (1998) (questioning whether migration actually depletes human capital). 
 54. Commander et al., supra note 20, at 34–39.  One potential benefit in addition to the 
increase in skilled workers in developing countries might be other beneficial spillover effects on 
the local economy.  The effect on the host countries and the reasons for them to want skilled 
immigration will be discussed infra, Part II.E. 
 55. Commander et al., supra note 20, at 35. 
 56. See, e.g., Commander et al., supra note 9, at 266. 
 57. On this point there is quite a consensus.  See Michel Beine et al., Brain Drain and 
Human Capital Formation in Developing Countries: Winners and Losers, 118 ECON. J. 631, 648 
(2008); Luca Marchiori et al., Brain Drain in Globalization: A General Equilibrium Analysis 
from the Sending Countries’ Perspective 7 (IZA Discussion Paper No. 4207, 2009).  Note that 
both of these papers, however, generally support the idea of some brain gain effect. 
 58. See Michel Beine et al., supra note 57, at 648 (finding brain gain mainly in countries 
with low rates of skilled migration, corresponding with what they call the “main globalizers,” i.e., 
India, China, and Brazil.  Conversely, the less developed countries with high rates of skilled 
migration, mainly the small countries of Africa and Latin America, are identified as clear losers, 
with an overall small negative effect from brain drain); Michel Beine et al., Measuring 
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sufficiency disputes, yet it does seem clear that simple generalizations and 
negative or positive tags are inappropriate.  The only exception may be, as 
mentioned above, that the least developed countries suffer the highest rates of 
brain drain.  There is more or less a consensus that those countries are victims 
of the phenomenon with little, if any, gains from brain drain. 
2. Remittances, Diasporas, and Returns 
Additional phenomena related to the brain drain should be mentioned 
separately because of their uniqueness and their uncertain effects on the 
sending countries.  These are: the issues of remittances by immigrants back to 
the sending countries; the creation of diasporas of sending countries’ affiliated 
citizens (“loyals”) in certain developed countries; and finally, the return of ex-
emigrants to their home countries.  All these have been explored by research 
on the benefits of brain drain.  However, these phenomena should be examined 
beyond merely whether they show existence of brain gain or not, since they 
may be targets of distinct policy measures, as explored below. 
B. Remittances 
This article assumes that remittances from immigrants to those “left 
behind” may generally improve the wealth and welfare of the latter, 
specifically, and the sending countries, generally.59  If this were not the case, 
then the potential benefits of the brain drain, at least through this channel of 
remittances, are diminished or non-existent.  For example, there is an argument 
that remittances are sometimes used for immediate consumption rather than 
investment, and at least in those cases, there is a benefit in the short term, but 
maybe only in the short term.60  Beyond enrichment, remittances in foreign 
currencies help economic growth because they relieve some foreign exchange 
constraints often faced by developing countries.61 
 
International Skilled Migration: A New Database Controlling for Age of Entry, 21 WORLD BANK 
ECON. REV. 249 (2007) (using age of exit from developing nations as a proxy for where 
education was obtained, and finding correlations to their original study showing some brain gain); 
Michel Beine et al., On the Robustness of Brain Gain Estimates (IZA Discussion Paper No. 4293, 
2009), available at http://www.michelbeine.be/pdf/annales%20final.pdf (supporting their 
conclusions in Measuring International Skilled Migration, controlling for new factors, including 
whether skilled migrants acquired their skills in the home or the host country).  See also Oded 
Stark, The New Economics of the Brain Drain, 6 WORLD ECON. 137, 139 (2005) (reviewing 
relevant contemporary research in support of the brain gain argument). 
 59. But see Riccardo Faini, Remittances and the Brain Drain: Do More Skilled Migrants 
Remit More?, 21 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 177 (2007) (examining whether, as traditionally 
thought, remittances improved the economic well-being of the recipients). 
 60. KAPUR & MCHALE, supra note 9, at 162. 
 61. See id. at 146 (discussing how in some developing countries remittances amount to a 
substantial portion of GDP, especially after macroeconomic or natural disasters). 
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A second assumption made by the relevant economic literature is that the 
brain drain and the increase of skilled emigration (compared to non-skilled 
emigration) would inevitably increase remittances and, consequently, their 
positive economic effects in the sending developing countries.62  This, of 
course, is an empirical question, yet it is one not so simple to answer.  In 
addition to the general lack of good data in the field, it is difficult to measure 
the isolated effect of remittances by skilled workers separate from those of 
unskilled workers,63 so it is problematic to incorporate available data into this 
picture. 
Some recent studies challenge this second assumption, arguing that the 
increase in skilled migration may actually result in fewer, not more, 
remittances.64  Skilled workers do earn more than unskilled workers, and 
therefore, they have the capacity to remit more, yet studies show that they do 
not always do so.65  One explanation is that skilled migrants often come from 
wealthier families, and therefore, they have less need to remit; another is that 
skilled workers usually spend longer periods abroad, which reduces their ties 
with their home countries and, hence, their propensity to remit.66  Additionally, 
studies show that remittances decline as the period of time migrants spend 
abroad increases.67  Another explanation is that skilled migrants are more 
likely to try to bring their families to join them in the host countries rather than 
support them in their home countries.68 
In conclusion, it is not possible to make the simple claim that the negative 
effects of the brain drain are offset by its positive effects through remittances.  
Better data and more targeted research are needed to better assess the effect of 
remittances on sending countries, and even then, these studies will probably be 
accurate only for the period, the set of countries, and the circumstances 
studied. 
 
 62. See, e.g., Dilip Ratha, Workers’ Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of 
External Development Finance, in WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: STRIVING 
FOR STABILITY IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: ANALYSIS AND STATISTICAL APPENDIX 157, 158 
(2003). 
 63. Commander et al., supra note 9, at 40. 
 64. See, e.g., Faini, supra note 59, at 178. 
 65. See, e.g., Richard H. Adams, Jr., The Demographic, Economic and Financial 
Determinants of International Remittances in Developing Countries 16 (World Bank Dev. Econ. 
Dep’t Dev. Prospects Grp., Working Paper No. 4583, 2008), available at http://www.ssrc.org/ 
workspace/images/crm/new_publication_3/{fof1bfa0-2d55-de11-afac-001cc477ec70}.pdf. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Faini, supra note 59, at 179. 
 68. See id. at 182–84. 
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C. Diasporas 
Communities of developing countries’ locals in developed countries 
(diasporas) may serve another beneficial purpose: They create a welcoming 
environment that is easier for future successful immigration from the relevant 
countries.  Additionally, diasporas may also support export from the “home” 
countries.69  They also tend to invest in such countries, either in the form of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) or by transferring knowledge and technology,70 
aiding growth and development in their home countries.71  Significant 
diasporas are also often associated with significant remittances.72  Arguably, 
diasporas should be viewed as a distinct phenomenon from the brain drain 
because they allow unique benefits to both the home countries and the 
emigrants themselves.73 
The concept of diaspora is not well-defined and may have very different 
effects in different circumstances—particularly, different host countries and 
their policies.  Also, the potentially positive effects of diasporas are not limited 
to skilled-worker migration; these effects may be even greater for non-skilled 
migrants.74  If indeed large diasporas behave differently, altering the impact of 
brain drain in certain developing countries, these unique effects must be 
identified in policy debates regarding brain drain,75 including in this article. 
D. Returns and “Brain Circulation” 
The potential benefits to home countries from returning skilled ex-
emigrants are quite straightforward.  They return with new capital, cutting-
edge training and knowledge, worldliness, and connections, all of which could 
immensely benefit their home developing countries.76  First, they bring 
investment that is more likely to stay in the developing country than other 
 
 69. Commander et al., supra note 9, at 259. 
 70. Yingqi Wei & V.N. Balasubramanyam, Diaspora and Development, 29 WORLD ECON. 
1599, 1600 (2006). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id.  As discussed above, it is not entirely clear what is exactly the effect of these 
remittances.  See supra Part I.A.2. 
 73. See Wei & Balasubramanyam, supra note 70, at 1600 (noting that the diaspora model 
accounts for benefits beyond resource allocation).  See also Frédéric Docquier & Elisabetta 
Lodigiani, Skilled Migration and Business Networks, 21 OPEN ECON. REV. 565, 586 (2010) 
(concluding that diaspora positively counters some brain drain). 
 74. See, e.g., Michel Beine et al., Diasporas 14 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 2607, 2009), 
available at www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/26652/1/597855889.pdf. 
 75. Specific policy responses to diasporas are mostly beyond the scope of this article.  For a 
detailed discussion of these policy responses, see id. 
 76. Commander et al., supra note 9, at 258. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
236 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:221 
investments.77  Second, they import technology and other intangibles that they 
acquired in the developed countries.78  Third, they are likely to develop new 
enterprises in their home countries,79 thereby creating new opportunities for 
employment and growth that are wholly endogenous.  Finally, they may 
benefit their home countries in many other ways that are less direct, such as 
contributing to a homegrown middle class, democracy, and healthy institutions 
or emphasizing desirable skills and education.80  Measuring these latter effects 
is much more complicated, yet may be more important than the direct 
economic effects.81 
Some argue that this picture is too rosy since those who come back are 
likely to be the less successful ones, leaving behind in the developed countries 
the most successful and promising talent.82  There is, however, disagreement 
among researchers as to the validity of this argument.83  If true, this argument 
implies that returns may result in minimal benefit—even damage—to the 
developing countries.  This implies that returns to sending countries do not 
help lessen the gap between the developed and developing countries; thus, 
policies that encourage emigrants to return should be more carefully 
scrutinized. Note, however, that it is possible that returning emigrants 
contribute—perhaps significantly—to their home countries, even if they were 
not the most successful abroad. In addition, another study implies that 
emigrants educated abroad—arguably the most skilled—are also the most 
committed to returning to their home countries and that they keep close 
connections with such countries believing that they will return, even if later 
than originally expected.84 
Finally, recent scholarship discusses a new way to view the skilled 
immigration phenomenon in general and returning migrants in particular, 
 
 77. See id. at 258–59 (discussing the relation between savings and entrepreneurial 
investment in the home country). 
 78. See KAPUR & MCHALE, supra note 9, at 169 (describing the benefits to Ireland’s high-
tech sector due to returning Irish in the 1990s). 
 79. Commander et al., supra note 9, at 258. 
 80. See KAPUR & MCHALE, supra note 9, at 175 (discussing the important role returning 
emigrants have for social change). 
 81. Id. at 5, 96. 
 82. KAPUR & MCHALE, supra note 9, at 171–72. 
 83. Commander et al., supra note 9, at 259 (stating studies suggest successful immigrants 
stay and poorly-performing immigrants return home, but that this is not necessarily always true).  
See also KAPUR & MCHALE, supra note 9, at 171 (discussing how the skill level of the returning 
emigrants depends on the initial skill level of migrants in the home country and the skill level of 
immigrants in the destination country). 
 84. WILLIAM A. GLASER, UNITED NATIONS INST. FOR TRAINING & RESEARCH, REPORT NO. 
22, THE BRAIN DRAIN: EMIGRATION AND RETURN xxxviii (1978). 
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termed “brain circulation.”85  These studies explore the phenomenon of skilled 
workers who migrate to a developed country, return to their home countries 
after some years, invest there, and then disseminate the knowledge acquired in 
the developed country.86  This is particularly interesting in cases where this 
route becomes engrained and is perpetuated by migrants from the same 
sending countries to the same host countries. 
E. Host (Developed) Country Perspective 
Little study has been conducted on the effect of the brain drain on the host 
countries in the context of development, probably because the focus of this 
literature was (and still is) on the developing countries and their quest for 
growth and development.  Yet, developed countries clearly are intertwined in 
the brain drain phenomenon.  For example, there has been increasing 
competition recently between these countries over skilled immigrants and the 
relaxation of immigration policies to target such immigration.87  The most 
instinctive perception is probably that the brain drain contributes to the 
increasing gap between these developed and developing nations.  This 
perception may politically benefit promoters of a tax on the brain drain; 
however, the validity of this claim should first be investigated. 
In this context, it may be useful to consider the motivation of the 
developed countries to attract skilled workers from other countries, including 
developing countries.  There is little debate that developed countries actively 
encourage brain drain.88  It is also quite generally accepted as a reasonable and 
not offensive policy.89  In some instances, aggressive actions may be viewed as 
skill poaching, yet this is not common.90 
Most directly, developed countries’ economies are hungry for skilled 
workers, as they increasingly depend on technology and services for growth.91  
They are not able to depend on homegrown skilled workers to fulfill their 
 
 85. JEAN M. JOHNSON & MARK C. REGETS, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SCI. RES. STUDIES ISSUE 
BRIEF NO. 98-316, INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS TO THE UNITED 
STATES-BRAIN DRAIN OR BRAIN CIRCULATION? 1 (1998), available at: http://www.nsf.gov/ 
statistics/issuebrf/sib98316.htm.  See also Saxenian, supra note 29, at 35 (analyzing the 
phenomena in India and China). 
 86. See Saxenian, supra note 29, at 37–38. 
 87. See KAPUR & MCHALE, supra note 9, at 37. 
 88. Commander et al., supra note 9, at 236. 
 89. This could, perhaps, be because of the real need for talent in developed countries, the 
human aspects, or the greater ease with which successful developed countries’ residents accept a 
class of developing countries’ immigrants similar to their own.  See KAPUR & MCHALE, supra 
note 9, at 70–72 (discussing the positive aspects of globalization and immigration). 
 90. Commander et al., supra note 9, at 236. 
 91. Stephen Moore & Vernon M. Briggs Jr., Forum: Immigration Policy and Skill 
Shortages, 8 EMP. REL. WKLY. (BNA) 1703 (1990). 
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needs for a variety of reasons, so they actively recruit foreigners.92  This lack 
of homegrown skilled workers is caused by demographic problems, 
particularly their declining and aging population.93  The aging populations also 
increase the need for growth, since social security networks in these countries 
depend on a fresh supply of young workers who earn enough to support those 
who do not work anymore.94  Finally, regardless of the important need for 
skilled workers, the ability of developed countries to increase the pool of 
qualified workers allows them to have a better overall workforce, since they 
can select from the best of the best.95  This argument assumes that some 
foreign workers are superior to some domestic ones, which seems trivially true.  
A less trivial assumption is that the developed countries are capable of 
choosing the best of the best among available workers.  There are good reasons 
to doubt the strength of this assumption because the motivations for 
immigration vary: Some potential immigrants may be more motivated 
(desperate) and, hence, more determined than others, which may affect their 
chances of successfully immigrating.  Note that the brain drain argument 
depends on the falsehood of this assumption, as explored above. 
For purposes of this article, it suffices to say that developed countries 
actively promote brain drain, sometimes aggressively, due to competition 
among themselves.  Because of this promotion by developed countries, the 
brain drain can potentially exacerbate the effects of this phenomenon on the 
sending developing countries.96  This, very basically, is the source of the moral 
obligation that developed countries have to developing countries, in the context 
of the brain drain.  More importantly, this moral obligation translates into 
possible political acceptance of measures in support of aid and development in 
connection with the brain drain, simply because it is perceived as fair. 
F. Relationship between Brain Drain, Trade, and Foreign Direct Investment 
This paper focuses on the brain drain as a stand-alone phenomenon; yet, of 
course, it has a strong influence on some crucial production factors.  Some 
work has been done since the 1980s on the relationship between skilled 
migration and international commerce.97  The “received wisdom” in this 
context was that international migration and trade should be substitutes since, 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. POPULATION DIV., UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, REPLACEMENT 
MIGRATION: IS IT A SOLUTION TO DECLINING AND AGING POPULATION? 4 (2001). 
 94. Id. at 97. 
 95. See generally KAPUR & MCHALE, supra note 9, at 37–38 (discussing the competition 
between Australia, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States for the most 
talented human capital and the immigration policies adopted to accommodate this competition). 
 96. See id. at 4–6 (discussing the effects of the brain drain on developing countries due to the 
competition between developed countries). 
 97. Giannoccolo, supra note 9, at 15 (summarizing research from that period). 
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as borders open and barriers to trade are eliminated, the wage gap that was 
considered the main cause of the brain drain will close, resulting in less 
migration.98  The same logic should apply to FDI.99  The reality has been more 
complex, however, and one survey concluded that the relationship among 
migration, trade, and FDI is too complex to draw definitive policy 
conclusions.100  The theory that skilled immigrants tend to invest more in their 
home countries than host countries was explored above in the context of 
diasporas and brain circulation, yet studies demonstrate that the 
complementary nature of brain drain and FDI stands, regardless of an 
established large diaspora.101  Understanding the importance of further study of 
this connection, this article shall ignore it due to the preliminary stage of its 
research. 
II.  TAXING THE BRAIN DRAIN 
The uncertainty explored in the prior section, describing the overall effects 
of the brain drain on the relevant parties and the magnitude of such effects 
make it difficult to design a policy measure that will accurately respond and 
counterbalance its effects—particularly the harm to developing countries.  
Nonetheless, there is a general belief that the phenomenon harms developing 
countries—at least the least-developed of these countries—more than it 
benefits them.  That observation, combined with the undisputable widening 
gap between developing and developed countries, can only support an already 
established moral argument in support of developed countries assisting 
developing countries in their quest for growth.  Tying such assistance to the 
brain drain phenomenon may provide more definite and legitimate support to 
such assistance. 
In the early 1970s, this observation led Jagdish Bhagwati to propose a tax 
on the brain drain.102  The proposal has been the focal point of the academic 
debate over potential taxation of the brain drain ever since, although it was 
never seriously implemented.103  Therefore, this section begins with a critical 
analysis of the Bhagwati tax and its evolution, proceeds to lessons regarding 
the design of such a tax, and concludes with suggested solutions to the design 
difficulties of a tax on the brain drain. 
 
 98. Artjoms Ivlevs & Jaime de Melo, FDI, the Brain Drain and Trade: Channels and 
Evidence 2 (Centro Studi Luca D’Agliano, Dev. Stud. Working Paper No. 261, 2008), available 
at http://www/dagliano.unimi.it/media/wp2008_261.pdf. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 2–3. 
 101. Id. at 18–20. 
 102. Jagdish Bhagwati, The United States in the Nixon Era: The End of Innocence, 
DÆDALUS, Fall 1972, at 25, 44. 
 103. Giannoccolo, supra note 9, at 15. 
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A. The Bhagwati Tax Proposal 
The original articulation of the Bhagwati tax was not the main focus of the 
article in which it appeared.  That article was primarily a very strong political 
(or a political economy) critique of the foreign policy of the Nixon 
administration in general and its trade policy in particular.104  Bhagwati’s 
argument was primarily a moral argument based on fairness and the idea of a 
tax imposed on migrants from developing countries into developed 
countries.105  The proposed tax would be collected by the developed countries 
and transferred to the developing countries.106  This was just “one idea” that 
the United States could adopt to fulfill its moral obligation towards developing 
countries.107  The sheer economic size and power of the United States and its 
multinational enterprises, according to Bhagwati, created such moral 
obligations.108 
Bhagwati elaborated on the problem of drain brain, as he called it, and 
proposed a pro-forma solution, in the context of the general criticisms of 
insufficient support of economic development and aid, at that time.  He 
proposed this solution because to him, the brain drain was closely related to 
another source of the moral obligation of the United States to developing 
countries—the scale of the American advantages in technology and capital, 
augmented by the “enormous salary differentials,” between the United States 
and developing countries.109  He rejected the alternative solutions of supporting 
research facilities in developing countries and imposing restrictions on 
immigration, citing both effectiveness and humanitarian grounds.110 
The proposal itself was very generic: imposition of a tax, possibly 15%, on 
the taxable income of immigrants, collected by the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) and transferred to the countries of origin of such migrants.111  The tax 
was intended to somewhat “compensate the poor country, while discouraging, 
however marginally, those migrants who shift locale simply for improved 
incomes.”112  The proposal developed into a specific policy prescription in 
later scholarship, where it also occupied center stage.113 
The following year, Bhagwati cooperated with William Dellalfar to 
provide a more detailed proposal and to test the proposal using actual and 
 
 104. Bhagwati, supra note 102, at 25–26. 
 105. Id. at 44. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 39–40. 
 109. Bhagwati, supra note 102, at 41. 
 110. Id. at 42. 
 111. Id. at 44. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See generally Jagdish Bhagwati & William Dellalfar, The Brain Drain and Income 
Taxation, 1 WORLD DEV. 94 (1973). 
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relevant data.114  Their self-proclaimed “realistic” estimate of a 10% tax on 
adjusted taxable incomes of professional immigrants from Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs) resulted in predicted tax revenue of over $62 million in 
1969, which was more than 10% of the net aid flow from the United States in 
1971.115  This was a rough estimate, but it demonstrated the potential 
significance of the proposed tax, especially if adopted by other developed 
countries or if “matched” by the remitting developed countries, as called for by 
Bhagwati and Dellalfar.116 
More importantly, Bhagwati and Dellalfar provided the analytical basis for 
the proposal, subject to the basic assumption that “one has LDC welfare in 
mind.”117  They elaborated on the reasons for rejecting alternative policies that 
were only briefly mentioned in the original paper118 and set the goal clearly: 
compensate developing countries for their losses and deter, if and to the extent 
possible, the phenomenon.119  This later paper also dealt with potential 
criticisms.120  The most obvious critique was that the proposed tax is 
inequitable because it increases the burden on immigrants.121  Bhagwati and 
Dellalfar rejected this argument, pointing out that the tax would be quite small 
in comparison to the benefit: the potential increase in salary that motivated the 
migration.122  A second critique was that the developing countries did not 
deserve the proceeds from this tax—a return on their investment in the 
migrants—since they did not really invest in them in the first place.123  
Bhagwati and Dellalfar’s response to this argument was that the permission to 
migrate itself represented a loss to the developing country and a corresponding 
benefit to the migrant.124  The authors added that there was a basis for the tax 
even if there was no welfare loss to the developing country involved: The 
country deserved to share part of the surplus created by the act of migration 
 
 114. See generally id. 
 115. Id. at 96. 
 116. Id. at 97 (estimating a potential total of $300 million). 
 117. Id. at 95. 
 118. In particular, they emphasize that the humanistic necessity of permitting emigration is 
not driven by economic factors, such as salary differentials, but rather by non-economic factors, 
including political and personal difficulties.  Since fairness is the ultimate guiding principle, they 
could not support barriers to personal freedom of relocation in those circumstances.  Bhagwati & 
Dellalfar, supra note 113, at 95. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Bhagwati & Dellalfar, supra note 113, at 95. 
 124. Id. 
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that it permitted to occur.125  They also anticipated constitutional constraints, 
but chose to postpone the discussion of those constraints.126 
Finally, Bhagwati and Dellalfar dealt with some important design 
questions regarding their proposed tax.  They suggested the tax be collected for 
ten years after migration, even though they preferred lifetime payments.127  
They believed developed countries would not support a lifetime payment, and 
complications such as change of citizenship might further encumber the 
issue.128  Also, they supported collecting the tax after immigration rather than 
upon a person’s exit, since the latter would be inefficient and inequitable.129  
This decision dictated that the tax should be collected by revenue authorities in 
developing countries, such as the IRS in the United States.130  They went even 
further, supporting collection under the auspices of the United Nations rather 
than under bilateral arrangements.131  It seems they believed this solution could 
be more effective, yet they also acknowledged the potential political objections 
and suggested mechanisms to alleviate such objections.132  This is interesting 
since it creates an option for international income yet to be explored seriously 
in international tax policy literature. 
In 1976, the Bhagwati tax proposal was presented again at an important 
international conference convened in Bellagio, Italy, resulting in two volumes 
containing the articles presented at the conference.133  These volumes included: 
a revised version of the Bhagwati and Dellalfar 1973 paper; additional revenue 
estimates from different countries to support that paper; legal analysis which 
pointed to legal and political hurdles the original proposal may have faced if 
implemented by host countries; and further progress in the economic debate 
over the harm brain drain causes sending countries.134  One of these books’ 
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contributions is an organized discussion of alternative measures to curb the 
brain drain and promote development and a more organized discussion of 
alternative tax schemes.135  Bhagwati did not advance a true new version of his 
proposal, yet he made clear that he viewed legal restrictions, particularly 
constitutional objections in the United States,136 as mandating a tax levied by 
developing rather than developed countries.  Bhagwati argued it would be 
practically difficult for developing countries to enforce such a tax without the 
help of developed countries, it must be done through some measure of 
cooperation—tax treaties (bilateral or multilateral) or through an international 
organization.137 
In a later article, Bhagwati distinguished taxing skilled immigrants from 
revenue-sharing between sending and host countries and clarified his view that 
these are distinct, even alternative, policy options.138  When he discussed the 
rationale for taxing the brain drain, he mentioned compensation for harm on 
one hand and taxing economic rents on the other hand.139  Bhagwati likened 
the enrichment of migrants to a windfall and, as such, non-distortionary (the 
tax does not change people’s choices).140  Nonetheless, he preferred a new 
“political” argument based on fairness, calling for taxation of emigrants in 
similar fashion to other constituents of home countries.141  He likened the 
failure to tax emigrants to “representation without taxation.”142  Slogans aside, 
it is obvious this argument arose from the attraction of Bhagwati and his 
proponents to the practical solution of citizenship-based taxation.143  This 
solution appeared to solve the legal problems the original proposal (a tax 
imposed by the host countries) faced in those host countries144 and satisfied the 
international preference for self-reliance by sending countries (and perhaps, 
also alleviated Bhagwati’s disappointment in the lack of political enthusiasm 
for his initial proposal).145  Then he turned to the revenue-sharing alternative 
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and basically supported it, if developed countries were willing to engage in that 
process with developing countries.146 
The complexity of the brain drain, as it unfolded in economic studies, also 
affected the evolution of the Bhagwati tax proposal.  In 1989, Bhagwati and 
Wilson edited a collection of articles exploring the effect of international 
mobility on tax policy.147  This book did not advance significant changes to the 
proposal, yet the book documented the Philippines’s failure to enforce a 
unilateral citizenship-based tax without the cooperation of the developed host 
countries.148  Overall, the impression is that Bhagwati remained supportive of a 
citizenship-based tax on skilled immigrants, yet one that benefits from 
cooperation with the developed host countries.149 
Discussion of Bhagwati’s proposal at this stage benefits from an 
acknowledgment of the nuances of various circumstances and countries that 
may affect such a tax’s design.150  This is essentially the current status of the 
Bhagwati tax proposal evolution.  It should be noted, however, Bhagwati has 
recently documented the development of his thoughts and various rationales.151 
Generally, the Bhagwati tax proposal was based on fairness and fairness-
related arguments.152  Yet, support for the proposal also came in the form of 
optimal tax literature and efficiency arguments.153  The basic premise was that 
developing countries would not be able to impose the progressive income tax 
the literature encouraged because skilled emigrants were not taxed; the 
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progressive income tax would incentivize emigration.154  That would be an 
incentive in the wrong direction.  Therefore, the conclusion was that a brain 
drain tax was necessary to maintain the integrity of the domestic progressive 
income tax in developing countries that suffer from brain drain.155 
Before we discuss the contemporary analysis of the Bhagwati proposal, it 
may be useful to summarize previous critiques.  The most consistent critique of 
the proposal was based on its unfairness toward migrants vis-à-vis fellow 
residents of host countries (where the host imposes the tax).156  Also, if the 
home country imposed a citizenship-based tax, it likely would be considered 
an inappropriate extension of its powers or, alternatively, impossible to 
enforce.157  Such a tax might also be politically unattractive to host countries 
required to accept the tax or assist in its enforcement.158  Similarly, some raised 
human rights concerns.  Critics were concerned curbing emigration may hurt 
those who wished to emigrate for reasons other than the capture of the 
economic rents—reasons which justify distinguishing their migration from 
those simply seeking higher salaries.159  Finally, brain gain proponents did not 
see the need for a tax where the underlying phenomenon presumably benefits 
developing countries.160  This article next explores the contemporary support 
and evaluation of the Bhagwati tax proposal and examines how the proposal 
responds to the aforementioned critiques. 
B. Revival of the Bhagwati Tax Idea 
Recent scholarship has found a renewed interest in the Bhagwati tax.  An 
interesting example of this new scholarship is John D. Wilson’s voluntary 
brain drain tax proposal.161  Wilson proposed creating an incentive for 
migrants to pay the brain drain tax voluntarily, not because the tax is voluntary, 
but rather because, absent the incentive, they would be expected to simply 
evade it.162  The proposed incentive is to lower the domestic tax payments of 
return migrants who actually paid the brain drain tax (as opposed to those who 
evaded it).163  Wilson acknowledged the scheme will create a disincentive to 
return for tax evaders, such as those who miscalculated their chances of return 
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and, therefore, evaded the initial payment.164  The scheme would also pressure 
governments to provide tax or other incentives to returning immigrants who 
return, even if they had not paid the voluntary tax.165  In response, Wilson 
emphasized how governments must build a reputation for upholding the law 
and enforcing tax incentives, which will eventually result in correct incentives 
for immigrants.166  Wilson also argued that such a scheme does not distort 
migration decisions.167  The primary reason for this proposal is the frustration 
with developing countries’ inability to tax the brain drain without the 
assistance of developed countries—assistance which is not generally 
available.168  Wilson recognized that, of course, the cooperation of developed 
countries could improve the scheme that is otherwise only a partial solution.169  
This proposal is concerning because it could be used to camouflage 
governments undesirably coercing immigrants to “volunteer” to pay the tax.  
This, some claim, is the reality in Eritrea.170 
John McHale also argued recently that the Bhagwati tax should be re-
evaluated due to several changed circumstances.171  These changes include the 
availability of better data about the magnitude of the brain drain, particularly 
the large rates of skilled immigration from Africa and the Caribbean region; 
the renewed understanding of the dire need for capital among the governments 
of developing countries; the understanding of the effects of globalization on 
skilled immigrants that allow closer connections with their home countries; 
and in some cases, better understanding of the harm caused in developing 
countries by the brain drain.172  Reviewing the failure of Bhagwati’s proposal 
to materialize as policy, McHale concluded that principled arguments, such as 
freedom, efficiency, and fairness—although worthy of answering—were not 
the reasons for such failure; rather, vested interests and administrative hurdles 
actually caused the failure of the idea.173  He then argued that the significant 
changes in the administrative environment, such as globalization, 
transnationalism, and international cooperation, warrant another attempt at 
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promoting the tax, regardless of the issue of “vested interests.”174  This is 
consistent with views of several other scholars,175 including Professor 
Bhagwati himself.176  In particular, McHale argued a citizenship-based tax is 
now more feasible than in the past because citizenship is “worth more,” and its 
administrative burdens, including the information furnishing requirements 
from developed countries, are not prohibitive.177  McHale and co-author 
Devesh Kapur provided further support for the brain drain tax in a book that 
analyzed the whole spectrum of potential policy responses to the brain drain, 
including three models of fiscal solutions: a citizenship-based tax that largely 
follows the modern version of the Bhagwati tax proposal, a revenue-sharing 
model that requires cooperation of developed countries, and an exit-tax 
mechanism.178 
In conclusion, the present interest in taxing the brain drain is apparent.  
The most attractive forms of such taxes seem to be the citizenship-based tax 
and a tax imposed with cooperation between developed and developing 
countries.  Still, the main problem with the former is the inability of 
developing countries to administer the tax, and the latter cannot be seriously 
considered without cooperation between countries.  This article next considers 
these and other design challenges from the perspective of the existing 
international tax law regime, and suggests that these challenges can be solved 
with little or no reform to the existing regime if political will exists. 
C. Design Challenges and Possible Solutions 
Determining the goal of the brain drain tax is the most important decision.  
The evolution of the Bhagwati tax proposal indicates that despite a constant 
reminder of the explicit fairness rationale, Bhagwati and others constantly 
debated the point of compensation (based on the harm, if any, caused by the 
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brain drain) and deterrence (stopping some of the brain drain, even if very 
little).179  These additional goals increased the difficulties of design: the former 
due to its complexity and uncertainty of magnitude (as explained in Part II), 
and the latter due to its potential undesirable human aspects.  For the purposes 
of this article, a tax on the brain drain may be one more weapon in the arsenal 
of development-supporting policies and would be based upon the actual 
commitment of host countries to support sending countries in their quest for 
development.  This commitment is observed and assumed without nuance for 
the purposes of this section.  The next section discusses the use of the funds 
raised by the tax. 
Once a goal is set, one should address the most fundamental international 
tax issue: jurisdiction or, in the context of this article, which country should 
impose the tax?  The original Bhagwati tax proposal envisioned a surtax 
imposed by the host country.180  Yet, the surtax idea received much criticism 
and was deemed legally impossible—or at least difficult to implement—due to 
the unequal taxation of these legal immigrants when compared to other 
taxpayers in the host country.181  Also, an additional tax may negate some of 
the host countries’ interests in permitting, and even encouraging, this 
migration.182  Therefore, as already mentioned, this model fell from grace and 
was abandoned in later versions of the proposal. 
The obvious alternative is a tax implemented by the sending country.  This 
was initially problematic because tax jurisdiction follows residence in our 
current international tax regime, and immigrants are residents of the host, not 
the home country, once they migrate.183  A solution to this difficulty was found 
in an alternative personal jurisdiction regime—citizenship-based taxation.184  A 
citizenship-based tax is justified by the immigrants’ continued ties with, and 
allegiance to, their home countries.185  This jurisdictional rule dominated, as 
mentioned above, the more recent version of the Bhagwati tax proposal.186  It 
was appealing because the United States has consistently taxed its citizens on a 
worldwide basis and basically without regard to competing tax jurisdiction 
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claims, even if such claims are made by its treaty partners.187  Why, then, could 
such treaty partners not use a similar rule and the United States, the most 
important host country, allow it to happen (and even assist in collecting it, at 
least on behalf of its developing tax treaty partners)?188 
There is nothing inherently problematic with this solution, but it requires 
the imposition of new taxation by the sending countries, since they currently 
do not impose citizenship-based worldwide income taxation like the United 
States does.  Note that this measure could not simply be initiated by a tax 
treaty itself, as part of the agreement between, for example, the United States 
and the home countries, because tax treaties are not supranational tax-imposing 
mechanisms.189  There are universal treaties that taxpayers may use, effectively 
by election, to alleviate excessive taxation of cross-border transactions.190  
More recently, the role of tax treaties in improving coordination between treaty 
partners, including enforcement and collection of existing taxes, has been 
emphasized, yet they never have been used to impose new taxes.191  The 
challenge of this construct is that sending countries may not be able to impose 
a new model of taxation without many legal and political complications.192 
This, however, does not mean the tax cannot be imposed by sending 
countries.  This is especially true if they already tax their residents on a 
worldwide basis, i.e., not exclusively on a territorial basis.  This system of 
taxation is much more common than citizenship-based worldwide taxation.193  
If developing countries consider the relevant emigrants their residents (and 
taxpayers), even after they have emigrated, it is possible to tax them.  This 
taxation could occur even if a tax treaty is in place, although minor 
amendments to tax treaties may be required to allow implementation of the 
Bhagwati-style brain drain tax.  Tax treaties envision cases of dual 
residence.194  In our case, the migrants remain by law, residents of their home 
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countries,195 yet over time they also establish residence in the host countries.196  
Almost all tax treaties include a provision to “break the tie” in such cases.  
Under the treaty, an individual is considered a resident of only one of the 
countries.197  Typically, taxpayers have the flexibility to arrange their affairs in 
a way that will ensure the outcome that benefits them the most.  For our 
purposes then, it is likely that most skilled immigrants will be able to avoid 
normal residence taxation by the home country. 
One response to skilled immigrants’ ability to avoid residence taxation of 
the home country could be a new separate tax on residents outside the 
jurisdiction of the treaty.  Yet this option suffers from the same problems of 
citizenship-based taxation.  A less aggressive move would be amending the tie-
breaking rules or simply providing in them that immigrants from the 
developing treaty partners will be considered residents of their home country 
for the purposes of the treaty, for a specified period of time post-immigration. 
Probably the least intrusive amendment of the rules would be to change the 
order of the tie-breaking tests.  Currently, the first test assigns residence to the 
country where the taxpayer has a permanent home available to her at all 
times.198  Obviously, this is completely controlled by the taxpayer.  Only when 
the taxpayer has a permanent home in both contracting countries, or in neither 
country, does the second test come into play.199  The second test assigns 
residence to the country where the taxpayer has her “centre of vital 
interests.”200  The second test is more subjective and less strictly controlled by 
tax planning.  During the first few years of immigration, it is arguable that the 
skilled immigrant’s “centre of vital interests” remains in the home country.  If 
the economic test does not produce the intended result, more weight could be 
given to family, social, and religious ties, as those ties tend to remain with the 
home country, while economic ties are often stronger with the host country.201  
Deviating from the model convention is not particularly difficult, as countries 
negotiate actual treaties that quite often vary from the model, although not 
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typically from these residence rules.202  Moreover, it is common practice in 
international arrangements that support development to grant some limited and 
temporary concessions to developing countries.203 
Once residence is established in the home country, that country has tax 
jurisdiction, and treaties should settle the division of revenue according to the 
treaty.  When employment is the most relevant item of income, Article 15 of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development’s Model 
Convention provides that a country may tax employment income of a non-
resident only if she was present in such country for more than 183 days.204  It 
seems obvious that, having gone to the trouble to migrate, skilled immigrants 
would typically stay away more than 183 days.  In this case, double taxation is 
possible, though it may not be an issue if income is not significant.205  If the 
worldwide taxation imposed by the home country is limited to a few 
percentage points (as was the case with the Bhagwati proposal), then the 
contracting states may tolerate this double taxation, modify it, or completely 
eliminate it.  This simple scheme can facilitate the modern version of the 
Bhagwati tax proposal with little tweaking of the current international tax 
regime and little effect on the tax balance between the countries involved. 
Developed countries could further assist developing countries in this 
context if they established, unilaterally or by agreement with specific 
countries, stricter rules for “establishment of residence”—say, beyond the 
conventional 183-day rule.  Naturally, if the host country does not claim tax 
jurisdiction based on residence, there is no conflict.  This, however, seems a 
very arbitrary and limited solution and could only last, if at all, for one or two 
years after immigration. 
Note that this residence solution is more challenging than amending the 
tie-breaking rules, yet would be easier than enacting a new citizen-based tax.  
This solution is risky, however, and potentially counterproductive, since 
immigrants might sever ties with their home countries earlier than they would 
absent these rules.  Further research on this point would be useful to better 
understand this risk. 
An objection to this solution may be that it weakens the international tax 
regime and the recent trend toward harmonization.  The strength of this 
established regime benefits both developed and (productive) developing 
countries, and changing it may result in more harm than benefit to the latter.  
This argument, however, is weak because the extent of deviation from the 
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model rules is quite limited and easily contained.  Also, most of the skilled 
migrants move to very few countries: the United States, Australia, Canada, 
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.206  And, the countries that suffer 
the most (mostly African and Caribbean countries) compose a small 
percentage of international commerce.207  Thus, these limited special rules are 
unlikely to frustrate the global balance. 
1. An Illustration 
To illustrate how a brain drain tax may work, take A, an Indian-born 
software engineer immigrating in Year 1, to work in the Silicon Valley, on an 
H1-B visa.208  He is an Indian citizen and resident and becomes a United States 
resident for tax purposes in Year 1, assuming that he spent essentially the 
whole year within the United States.209  He earns $100 as wages for his work 
in the United States and suffers an assumed tentative tax of $30.  Let us 
assume that Indian income (wage) taxes would also amount to $30.  The 
United States has entered into a tax treaty with India, partly for the purposes of 
eliminating double taxation of taxpayers such as A.210 
Two preliminary investigations are required prior to analyzing the tax 
consequences for A under the treaty.  First, one should establish substantive 
scope: whether the taxes involved are covered by the treaty.  Article 2, entitled 
“Taxes Covered,” provides that the treaty covers the income taxes of both 
countries, any surcharge on them, and also any similar taxes imposed after the 
treaty’s enactment.211  This is a standard provision in tax treaties,212 and in 
most cases the relevant tax base for brain drain taxes is wages,213 and the 
relevant taxes are the regular income taxes on wages.214  If a home country 
were to enact a separate brain drain tax as a surtax or a separate tax, it would 
still probably fall within the substantive scope of the treaty, as a tax 
substantially similar to an income tax under Article 2(2).  In any event, 
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enactment of such a separate tax should be communicated to the treaty partner; 
it is difficult to envision such an enactment without a prior agreement 
stipulating that the host country will recognize the new tax.  This could be 
done through a common competent authority agreement under the tax treaty. 
The second, and more important, scope issue for our purposes is that of 
personal scope or residence.  The United States-India treaty essentially applies 
only to residents of the contracting countries.215  Residence is determined 
under Article 4(1), which refers to the residence rules of the contracting 
countries: “For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘resident of a 
Contracting State’ means any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable 
to tax therein by reason of his domicile, residence, citizenship, place of 
management, place of incorporation, or any other criterion of a similar 
nature.”216  In our hypothetical, A will certainly be a resident of the United 
States; if India chooses to implement a brain drain tax scheme, it will make 
sure A is also considered a resident of India.  It is easy to see that in the typical 
cases, immigrants will be dual residents.  “Breaking the tie,” by determining 
residence in only one of the contracting countries, is one of the more important 
and effective roles of tax treaties.  Article 4(2) provides: 
  Where by reason of the provisions of paragraph 1, an individual is a 
resident of both Contracting States, then his status shall be determined as 
follows: 
  (a) he shall be deemed to be a resident of the State in which he has a 
permanent home available to him; if he has a permanent home available to him 
in both States, he shall be deemed to be a resident of the State with which his 
personal and economic relations are closer (centre of vital interests); 
  (b) if the State in which he has his centre of vital interests cannot be 
determined, or if he does not have a permanent home available to him in either 
State, he shall be deemed to be a resident of the State in which he has an 
habitual abode; 
  (c) if he has an habitual abode in both States or in neither of them, he shall 
be deemed to be a resident of the State of which he is a national; 
  (d) if he is a national of both States or of neither of them, the competent 
authorities of the Contracting States shall settle the question by mutual 
agreement.217 
This, again, is a very common provision in tax treaties,218 and as explained 
above, it is usually decided on the permanent home questions.219  Assuming 
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that A, like most immigrants, does not have a permanent home available to him 
in India and that he must live somewhere other than a hotel in the United 
States, he will be recognized under the treaty as being only a United States 
resident.  This is undesirable for India if it wishes to tax the brain drain: The 
place of permanent residence is mostly under the control of the taxpayer.  If, 
however, the second test (personal and economic ties) comes into play, there is 
a greater chance that some recent immigrants will still be considered Indian 
residents for treaty purposes.  As suggested above, this is not an elegant or 
comprehensive solution; a better one will be to agree with the United States on 
interpretation of the “centre of vital interest” test, such that a sufficient portion 
of Indian immigrants are considered Indian residents for treaty purposes for an 
agreed number of years. 
In the case of the United States, there is one variation that may be helpful 
or detrimental to a brain drain tax.  Article 1(3), better known as the “saving 
clause,” provides: 
  Notwithstanding any provision of the Convention except paragraph 4, a 
Contracting State may tax its residents (as determined under Article 4 
(Residence)), and by reason of citizenship may tax its citizens, as if the 
Convention had not come into effect.  For this purpose, the term “citizen” shall 
include a former citizen whose loss of citizenship had as one of its principal 
purposes the avoidance of tax, but only for a period of 10 years following such 
loss.220 
This is a uniquely American provision that ensures the integrity of the United 
States’ taxation of the worldwide income of its citizens, regardless of their 
residence elsewhere—a uniquely American tax treatment.221  But, note that 
Article 1(3) applies bilaterally: India could also tax its citizens regardless of 
this treaty’s application.222  Proponents of the Bhagwati tax proposal were 
attracted to a solution under which India, for example, could use this provision 
to tax the brain drain emigrants, regardless of the residence determination in 
the treaty (most likely the United States, in the case of A).223  The problem with 
this solution, as mentioned above, is that, first, India must change its tax 
system to what would likely be a very unpopular system (to both emigrants and 
potential emigrants).  Even if such change occurred, migrants like A would 
face double taxation: citizenship-based taxation by India and residence-based 
taxation by the United States.  Note that the double-taxation relief mechanism, 
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either the domestic, unilateral United States foreign tax credit224 or Article 25 
of the United States-India treaty,225 would not help in this case.  The United 
States would generously grant a foreign tax credit to its residents, but only 
against their foreign source income; A’s income at issue here is unquestionably 
domestic, as it is earned from services performed within the United States.226  
Double taxation may not be so worrisome if it is only an Indian brain drain tax 
of a few percentage points that is applied on a citizenship basis.  This indeed 
was the original intention of the Bhagwati tax proposal.  In that case, though, 
India should make sure that the United States accepts that tax as falling within 
the substantive scope of the treaty and that such tax does not taint the regular 
income tax, making it non-creditable in the United States, for example.  The 
conclusion must be that if India were to take this direction, it should implement 
it in cooperation with the United States. 
At this point, the taxing rules come into play.  The United States would 
want to tax the wages earned in the United States because even non-residents 
are taxed on their United States source income from employment.227  If A were 
a non-resident of the United States under the treaty, as a result of the tie-
breaking rule he would be taxed in the United States under both domestic law 
and the treaty.  This is because the treaty in Article 16 (an older version of 
current Article 15 of the OECD Model, but with a similar effect in this case) 
permits the country of source (the United States) to tax wages earned within its 
territory, if the taxpayer was present in that country for more than 183 days in 
the relevant tax year and was employed by a non-resident.228  Since A, like 
most immigrants, is employed by a resident corporation and was present in the 
United States for most of the tax year, he will not be able to avoid United 
States taxation of his wages.229  Applying the treaty may be relevant for 
obtaining a credit in India, yet it does not matter for the purposes of a case for 
a brain drain tax.  This means that only a special tax imposed by India with the 
agreement of the United States, effectively resulting in double taxation of 
wages, could be useful as a brain drain tax of the kind sought in this article.  
This, in fact, is close to the Bhagwati vision in the first place. 
Finally, two other elements of tax treaties should be mentioned, since they 
are instrumental in this case.  First, effective exchange of information is key to 
India’s ability to measure the relevant income and assess an accurate brain 
drain tax.230  Second, assistance in the collection of taxes provision may reduce 
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the administrative burden on India significantly.231  This is particularly true in 
a country such as the United States, where the government will have the 
relevant information, regardless of actual tax payments by the immigrant.  As a 
resident under the United States domestic rules (even if a non-resident for 
treaty purposes), A most likely will be required to file a federal income tax 
return in the United States.232  A similar outcome would occur even if the tax 
treaty did not apply, so long as an exchange of information treaty existed.233  
Otherwise, more specific arrangements will be required to replicate the above 
scenario, in order to allow a brain drain tax to be implemented effectively. 
In conclusion, a brain drain tax may be implemented under the current 
international tax regime, yet, as demonstrated by this very simple and non-
technical illustration, the details of each bilateral scenario must be explored 
separately and solved between the relevant countries accordingly. 
III.  TAXING BRAIN DRAIN AS A NEW DEVELOPMENT POLICY MEASURE 
Keeping in mind the complexity of the brain drain phenomenon, the prior 
section demonstrated that a tax on the brain drain may be implemented within 
the current international tax regime.  This, however, is insufficient for the 
purposes of this article, which argues for development-supporting policy 
measures in connection with the brain drain and, in particular, a brain drain 
tax.  The success of the proposed tax and related measures should be measured 
by how effectively they promote development in developing nations.  This 
section discusses the properties and design features a brain drain tax needs to 
succeed in this regard.  Specifically, it explains why designing a proper 
mechanism to effectively use the proceeds of a brain drain tax is as important 
as the design of the taxing mechanism itself.  The tax and the program for 
using the proceeds must be developed and operated in tandem to be effective.  
This observation is part of a more general approach to development, termed 
here the “new development agenda,” that advocates a gradual, trial-and-error, 
accountable, entrepreneurial, and local approach, in an attempt to discover 
what works in development.  It rejects the currently dominant centralized 
planning approach that is aggressively mandated by international institutions 
and other major players in the development scene. 
Earlier discussions of the brain drain tax idea in general, and the Bhagwati 
tax proposal in particular, were limited to the revenue-collecting element, 
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paying—at most—lip service to the use of collected funds.234  A key element 
of the Bhagwati tax proposal was that it evolved in the context of traditional 
development policy that relied, and still heavily relies, on the current leading 
international organizations and their centralized planning, foreign aid 
maximization strategy.235  One of the original proposals was that the tax may 
be collected and later distributed to developing countries by the United Nations 
according to its general aid strategy.236  The failure of this traditional 
development policy makes this part of the proposal questionable, if 
development is indeed the goal of the tax.  This development policy failure 
should burden any suggestion in the development field, mandating not only an 
effective contribution, but also effective distribution and implementation ideas.  
The new development agenda provides exactly that: ideas about what may 
work, acknowledging the failure of central planning and grand strategies.  This 
article seeks to associate the brain drain tax with the new development agenda 
and the analysis of design requirements that such associations generate. 
A. New Development Agenda 
To understand the approach to development followed in this article, one 
must first realize the reasons for the failure of the currently dominant 
development policies.237  Development literature has focused for a long time 
on increasing and maximizing foreign aid.238  It is still the case that the most 
influential actors in the development world—the international organizations, 
non-governmental organizations, activists, and even prominent development 
economists—all insist on maintaining focus on the maximization and 
insufficiency of funds devoted to aid.239  This is very attractive for the 
international organizations because they depend on aid funds for their 
existence and power, and because it makes these organizations seem like the 
only friend of the underdog.  Focusing on maximizing aid also shifts the focus 
away from these organizations themselves and their failure to use the available 
funds productively.  The bottom line is that development policies and 
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initiatives led by these organizations have repeatedly failed, and the gap 
between the developed and developing countries continues to grow.240 
Aware of these disappointing results, the international organizations revise 
the content of their plans from time to time, promising time and time again that 
now they have really got the solution, if only they had sufficient funds to 
implement the plans.241  Recent critiques, primarily among academic 
economists, observed that the problem is not only with the substance of the 
plans, but also with the approach and centralized planning itself.242  They have 
challenged this paradigm, calling instead for a shift of focus to smaller-scale, 
more measurable initiatives that have a chance of success.243  Moreover, more 
technical critiques have challenged the importance of the studies that attempted 
to demonstrate a positive causal relationship between aid and development (via 
growth).244  Consequences of these critiques are that they question the mega-
plans and singular solutions that depend on volumes of aid money and on large 
centralized and centralizing organizations and express preference for 
entrepreneurial, local, more easily measured solutions supported by a trial-and-
error process. 
A comprehensive description of the new development agenda is beyond 
the scope of this article, and it may also be impossible, by definition, because 
the central idea of this agenda is openness to a variety of ideas and 
methodologies, pluralism, and experimentation, rather than tight planning.  
Nonetheless, several principles may be extracted from the very recent literature 
that developed this agenda: 1) Development measures should be experimental; 
2) All measures should be designed with clear and desirably measurable goals 
and methods to empirically test for success (preferably subject to independent 
evaluation); 3) No one-size-fits-all planning; 4) Preference for “searchers”245 
over planners, for entrepreneurship and local solutions over mega solutions; 5) 
Acceptance that progress may be gradual, piecemeal, and in small steps to be 
sustainable, and rejection of “big pushes.”246 
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B. The Potential Role of Taxation in a New Development Agenda 
The role of taxation as a whole in this new agenda is likely to be quite 
minor, not unlike its minor importance in the current development agenda.  
Tax policy and development policies tend to intersect on two basic issues: tax 
reforms in developing countries and the use of tax incentives by developing 
countries to attract investment.  The former usually involves the International 
Monetary Fund promoting its boilerplate tax reforms as a condition for 
receiving its funds; not surprisingly, these initiatives have met little success to 
date.247  The story of tax incentives is a bit more complicated.  Tax incentives 
were considered important to attract investment, mainly FDI, into developing 
countries based on the belief that FDI would then assist these countries to grow 
and subsequently develop economically.248  This causal chain has proven to be 
largely unsubstantiated in reality.249  Nonetheless, developing countries are 
often forced to continue granting tax incentives in order not to lose investment, 
a phenomenon often called “tax competition.”250  Lack of international 
cooperation and coordination of tax policies often trap them in this situation.251  
Since the effect of taxation on location of investment decisions is quite small 
generally, tax was never an important part of the development policy 
measures.252  A comprehensive analysis of the role of tax incentives in a 
development agenda is beyond the scope of this article, but the next section 
analyzes opportunities to use tax incentives to promote development in the 
context of the brain drain. 
Taxation is also a controversial policy tool in the development context 
because it is strongly guarded and regarded by all countries, including 
developed countries, as an important articulation of their sovereignty, 
particularly in our increasingly globalized world.  Hence, countries will be 
naturally reluctant to give up taxing jurisdiction or powers, even for causes that 
they otherwise support. 
Taxation is also not a natural candidate for new development agenda 
policy measures, because the current international tax regime holds that any 
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tax should take into account, if not ensure, compatibility with the regime.253  
This article has already demonstrated that compatibility is possible under 
specific circumstances or a more serious willingness to adjust current rules.254  
Additionally, taxes are governed predominantly by acts of parliaments, and as 
such, they are quite rigid, highly political (even the most domestic ones), and 
not easy or quick to adjust—the most important properties required from new 
development agenda policy measures.255  Finally, real-world taxes are always 
distortionary and affect everyone, particularly the imposing country’s 
constituency, as well as relevant countries that interact with each other.256  
Therefore, their success as policy measures is uniquely difficult to measure, 
since they cannot be fine-tuned to “only” promote development, for instance. 
Nonetheless, the new development agenda, although it does not offer a 
panacea in this (or another) field, may be useful to refocus a tax policy 
measure such as the brain drain tax and make it more effective for, and 
beneficial to, developing countries.  Moreover, it may be useful in improving 
and increasing cooperation and coordination of tax policies between productive 
countries in general, and in the development context in particular.  Many 
developed countries spend significant amounts of money on aid in various 
forms257 with little to show for it and no ability to evaluate their actions and 
reasons for failure.  A new development agenda compatible tax will at least 
give them a chance to avoid wasting the vast development funds to the benefit 
of all. 
C. A Brain Drain Tax as a New Development Agenda Policy Measure 
1. Tying the Collection and Use Functions Together 
As already explored, there are several ways to tax the brain drain to benefit 
development.  The dominant paradigm, discussed in the more recent literature, 
is a tax imposed by the home country on the income of immigrants earned in 
the host country.258  The tax is then enforced by the home country with a 
varying degree of help from the host country.259  A critical missing part of this 
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paradigm is the manner in which the funds generated by the tax will be used to 
support development.  These two parts of the tax (collection and use) 
technically may be designed separately, yet must be coordinated and consistent 
with the new development agenda to be an effective development supporting 
device.  Past literature focused only on the first part—the taxing mechanism—
and essentially ignored the second part of putting the collected revenue to 
work.260  The former section mentioned that the original Bhagwati tax proposal 
discussed this only briefly, expressing a preference for a centralized collection 
entity, specifically mentioning the United Nations, and refraining from setting 
targets for the funds.261  This meant that the funds would be left for the United 
Nations to use at its discretion, mixed with its other funds devoted to 
development.  This choice by Bhagwati does not seem to be backed by 
methodical analysis, but rather a desire to avoid the more straightforward 
solutions of transferring the funds to the sending (developing) countries or 
using them mixed with the general foreign aid funds of the collecting 
(developed) countries.  This is consistent with the general character of the 
proposed tax as a morally-based rather than a compensatory mechanism.262  
This article supports a similar type of tax, yet it argues that the use of the tax’s 
proceeds must be more carefully considered.  Blending the proceeds with the 
general funds utilized by the international organizations will be 
counterproductive, and the “new” tax may be viewed (correctly) as nothing but 
another excuse to increase aid and a wasteful addition to the arsenal of aid-
increasing mechanisms at that. 
One may object to the argument that the collection and the use functions of 
the tax should be tied together, claiming that it is simply an argument against 
current development policies in general.  Another version of such argument 
may be that the problem is not with the design of the tax itself, but rather with 
the use function, so that function should be discussed separately without 
tampering with the already (relatively) well-designed collection function.  
Such objection misses the most important point of this article: that there is no 
clear independent justification for a brain drain tax other than the support of 
development, and therefore, there is no justification for collecting the brain 
drain tax standing alone.  Further, the above argument falls into the same 
failing pattern, so familiar in the recent history of the international 
organizations: the constant revisions of plans when the problem may lie in the 
paradigm.  A brain drain tax is worth the investment of time and administration 
only if it will transparently support development.  To support development, 
consistent with the new development agenda, the tax’s proceeds should be 
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used in a transparent manner, with clear goals and parameters to measure 
success in achieving such goals. 
An equally important reason for the design of a complete tax measure, in 
which collection and usage functions are tied together, is that it should be 
politically easier to adopt.  Designing responsible and effective usage of 
development funds should be easier in the context of a proposal of a new 
measure, especially a new tax, and it should carry more weight than generally 
protesting the waste of aid funds by the international organizations.  This is 
particularly important for the brain drain tax, since legitimacy and participation 
seem to be the key to its success.  It is not difficult to realize how powerful 
skilled migrants could be in their opposition to such a tax, especially if they 
could convincingly argue that the tax’s proceeds are likely to be wasted. 
2. Design 
It should be clear by now to the reader that channeling the collected 
revenue to an international organization, such as in the original Bhagwati 
proposal, will not be realistically compatible with the new development 
agenda; this does not mean that compatibility is impossible.  For example, one 
can envision a cooperative effort of some developed countries in the direction 
of the new agenda that will collect funds from a brain drain tax or, 
alternatively, from the general revenue base, yet the portion assigned to the 
collective effort will be measured by the brain drain or its potential positive 
contribution to the participating developed countries.  This option, however, 
seems unlikely in the short term, so this section will focus on the version of the 
brain drain tax discussed in this article (a home country tax, collected with 
some assistance by the host countries). 
Probably the most formidable argument against the version of the brain 
drain tax discussed in this article would be that the proceeds of the brain drain 
tax should simply go to the government of the home developing country.  It is 
straightforward, fair, and legally required, maybe since this is the function of 
any tax: to provide revenue to the general budget of the imposing government.  
Moreover, there is no intuitive conflict between this solution and the new 
development agenda, since the first question would examine how that 
government uses the revenue, and one may want to direct the energy to support 
such governments in correct use of the funds.  Second, the new development 
agenda encourages local solutions, and arguably, local government will be the 
ultimate source for local solutions—especially when compared to foreign 
advice about how to use the funds, the norm under traditional development 
policies.  A related point is, of course, that denying the local governments the 
funds imitates the objectionable IMF conditionality regime and hated 
colonialist or other oppressive patterns. 
All of these objections have a grain of truth in them, yet they cannot lead 
one to the conclusion that a brain drain tax should simply increase the budget 
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of the home countries.  This would amount to a measure very similar to foreign 
aid and, therefore, is doomed to the same fate.  Specifically, concerns about 
weak governments, corruption, insufficient institutions, et cetera make this 
version unattractive, and may portray a brain drain tax as a gimmick, simply to 
generate more aid, with no better chance of doing good. 
Realistic versions of the tax will involve concessions and cooperation of 
the host countries with the home countries, and the former will do that solely 
for the purposes of supporting development.  A simple increase of the home 
countries’ budgets will not achieve that goal.  This seems like a Catch-22, 
since on the other hand, excessive conditions or denials of the funds from these 
governments will be perceived as unfair.  This article argues that there is no 
one solution for this problem, and success lies in closer cooperation between 
the relevant home and host countries, based on some general guidelines 
applied to the specific circumstances of each bilateral (or larger) scenario.  One 
such guideline would be that the brain drain tax proceeds could not be 
intermingled with the general budget.  Another would be that the proceeds 
could only fund defined projects, with explicit goals and clear methodologies 
to assess the attainment of such goals.  De facto assessment and follow up, as 
well as post-experiment study and evaluation, must be required to receive 
additional funds.  Finally, boilerplate solutions or proposed projects are not 
acceptable. 
The legal framework for this type of solution is not fundamental to its 
success, yet it seems that, realistically, bilateral treaties offer the best chance of 
success.  Bilateral treaties are likely to accommodate the specific needs and 
circumstances of the relevant scenario.263  The treaty could be an addendum or 
protocol to a tax treaty between the countries, if one exists.  It would not fit 
into the regular income tax treaty, since its policy goals are very different 
(support of development versus elimination of double taxation and cooperation 
in enforcing taxation) and since regular treaties are not very flexible and often 
take a long time to amend and renegotiate.264  But some provisions in tax 
treaties may well serve an agreement on a brain drain tax: The exchange of 
information and the dispute resolution provisions come immediately to 
mind.265  Countries may choose to establish a bilateral vehicle—a board of 
advisers, for example—that will review the use of the tax proceeds and audit 
its consistency with the guidelines in the agreement between the contracting 
countries. 
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A general objection to this scheme may be that it is more likely to benefit 
the “haves” than the “have-nots.”  Countries such as India, China, and Brazil 
have more skilled emigrants, a higher potential tax base for the brain drain tax, 
and are, therefore, more likely to enter into agreements on the tax with the 
relevant developed countries than the least developed countries of Africa and 
the Caribbean region.266  Such “have” countries may be politically and 
economically more important to the developed countries, may suffer less from 
the problems that make developed countries’ citizens worry about the use of 
the funds, and may already be engaged in many more agreements with these 
countries.  This would make cooperation easier, even at the individual human 
level.  This is indeed a serious concern and, if true, could severely damage the 
legitimacy of the tax.  One reason for optimism, however, is that at least in the 
tax context, countries tend to adopt general policies and be quite consistent 
about them, even if they are not required to do so.267  For example, some 
developed countries grant developing countries tax sparing, which is an aid 
equivalent benefit.268  This is rarely a negotiated part of tax treaties and is often 
accepted as a general policy with no clear reason behind its grant.269  Another 
example is the United States’s willingness to eliminate withholding taxes on 
intercompany dividends; once given in one treaty, this allowance was granted 
to many other treaty partners.270 
Finally, one may argue that the scheme is not fair because the needs of 
developing countries probably do not correspond to their ability to collect 
revenue from a brain drain tax.  Consequently, the tax may result in an 
increasing gap between the actually developing countries and the least-
developed countries.  This gap may occur, yet it would be inappropriate to 
expect every development policy measure to fully conform to one’s sense of 
fair resource allocation.  The brain drain tax is not meant to be a cure-all; in 
fact, it is quite clear the tax is only a minor measure in the general scheme of 
encouraging development, yet may be important and beneficial for countries 
that need it. 
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This section analyzed the design features required from a brain drain tax in 
order for it to be compatible with the new development agenda and achieve the 
set goal of development promotion.  The key argument was that the use and 
collection functions of the tax must be tied together and cannot be analyzed or 
implemented separately.  The conclusion was that, realistically, such a tax may 
only be implemented successfully by bilateral treaties that establish 
mechanisms to administer the tax cooperatively between host and home 
countries, set parameters for the use of the tax proceeds, and establish the 
mechanisms for enforcing such parameters.  The difficulties of entering into a 
balanced and workable treaty are significant, and there are some potentially 
weighty arguments against them that may weaken the most important 
advantage this tax has as a development measure: political acceptability due to 
its perceived fairness. 
D. Other New Development Agenda Policy Measures Related to the Brain 
Drain 
A brain drain tax, and particularly the version of this tax imposed by the 
home country and enforced in cooperation with the host country, is the primary 
focus of this article.  Nevertheless, to get a complete picture, there are several 
complementary and alternative measures needing exposure that are based on 
the same reality and legal and political grounds.  The easy cases are the 
alternative tax schemes.  Typically, two schemes compose this category: exit 
taxes and tax sharing (between the developed host and developing home 
countries).271  Exit taxes seek to deter and reduce brain drain by making it 
costly to leave the home countries.272  They are considered objectionable on 
moral and human rights grounds, similar to any other measure that limits 
movement of individuals.273  Exit taxes are also unlikely to be effective since 
at the time of migration, emigrants are yet to benefit from the increase of 
wages, for instance.  Alternative enforcements, such as deferral of payment of 
such taxes or posting bonds upon emigration, have not proved much better.274  
Revenue-sharing schemes as alternative or complementary schemes to regular 
foreign aid are interesting, but they require sophisticated cooperation between 
countries, coordination of their tax policies, and enforcement at levels beyond 
 
 271. See KAPUR & MCHALE, supra note 9, at 190–95. 
 272. Tesón, supra note 152, at 904. 
 273. Steven J. Arsenault, Surviving A Heart Attack: Expatriation and the Tax Policy 
Implications of the New Exit Tax, 24 AKRON TAX J. 37, 61–62 (2009) (listing the ability to 
immigrate as a basic human right). 
 274. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigoratiing Tax Expenditure Analysis 
and Its International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 528–30 (2008) (discussing the United 
States’ deferral of income earned by a United States citizen through a foreign corporation). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
266 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:221 
that which is required for the brain drain tax to have a chance of success.275  
The current reality of non-cooperation in tax matters, even among developed 
countries, makes one skeptical if this policy option is viable, at least in the 
foreseeable future.276 
Tax incentives that will be complementary to a brain drain tax, however, 
seem a more viable option.  The basic idea here is to design tax incentives that 
will encourage behavior beneficial for development in the context of the brain 
drain.  Tax incentives can and should target specific, well-defined, and isolated 
behavior.  Done correctly, such incentives may be compatible with the new 
development agenda.  They also may be granted by both developing and 
developed countries, depending on whose behavior the scheme wishes to 
encourage, and in coordination between these countries, so the effects do not 
cancel one another.  Note, however, that in contrast to the central idea explored 
in this article—the brain drain tax—an appropriate design of these tax 
incentives depends on a better and more accurate understanding of the 
economic effects of the brain drain.  Each measure, therefore, will require a 
strong empirical basis and follow-up to adapt to changing circumstances to be 
effective. 
The more obvious such tax incentives would be provided by the sending 
developing countries.  First, they may choose to use tax incentives to prevent 
or, more realistically, to diminish brain drain itself.  This could be done by 
providing, for example, preferential taxation for educated or skilled workers 
staying at home for X years after their graduation or training.  If the brain gain 
argument is correct with respect to such a country, this tax incentive may 
reinforce its effect.  This is particularly true if it is correct that actual skilled 
immigrants are not necessarily the very best and brightest.277  A second type of 
relevant tax incentive that the sending developing country may provide is on 
the other end of the cycle, i.e., providing incentives to return home for skilled 
workers.  An example for this is a new Israeli program to reverse the brain 
drain.278  Again, this incentive will be particularly effective if the sending 
country is able to pick and choose the best and brightest, or the most needed, 
returning skilled workers.  Finally, tax incentives could be used to encourage 
desirable transactions between the emigrants to developed countries and those 
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“left behind.”  Such transactions may include: no or low taxation of 
remittances; tax incentives to business investment by emigrants in their home 
countries; and tax incentives to domestic businesses that export to, or 
otherwise transact business with, diasporas. 
Developed countries could also provide tax incentives to a similar end.  A 
brain drain tax itself may impact the decision of skilled workers of whether to 
emigrate or stay at home.  Additionally, education and training of workers in 
developing countries may be supported by tax incentives provided by 
developed countries.  Migrants native to developing countries, now residents 
of developed countries, are the most likely people to temporarily return to their 
home countries and to support and educate new generations.  Tax incentives 
granted by the migrants’ new countries of residence may fortify these efforts, 
with potentially desirable effects.  Research, of course, is required to establish 
whether such tax incentives in any country’s case will: 1) actually affect 
behavior (i.e., encourage more people to go back to their home countries and 
contribute their knowledge in educating newer generations); and 2) have a 
desirable effect (i.e., increase the brain gain by the home countries). 
Similarly, developed countries could provide tax incentives in the context 
of skilled emigrants returning to their home countries.  In the case of the 
United States, for example, immigrants who naturalize are still required to file 
United States tax returns, even if they decide to return to their home country.279  
One may suggest that the United States can concede taxation of such citizens.  
This is consistent with the suggestions discussed here, yet it seems unlikely 
because the worldwide taxation of all citizens has been a fundamental feature 
of United States tax policy for a relatively long time.280  Nonetheless, two 
additional routes to a similar result exist.  First, citizens may renounce their 
citizenship.281  Even if done for immigration and naturalization law purposes, 
renunciation may not exempt the returning migrant from United States 
worldwide taxation because the United States’ Internal Revenue Code provides 
for taxation of expatriates for ten years after their loss of status in certain 
circumstances.282  The United States could provide a specific exemption from 
this rule in cases of returning immigrants to certain developing countries.  This 
would have an effect similar to exemption from worldwide taxation of citizens, 
yet it seems much more likely to be adopted.  A second route may be to amend 
Internal Revenue Code Section 911 that provides a capped exemption from 
United States taxation to certain citizens living outside the United States.  The 
exemption may be specifically amended or tailored to the needs of skilled 
workers returning to their developing home countries: an increased cap or 
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waiver of other required circumstances, such as a maximum amount of days 
spent within the United States in the relevant tax year, come to mind.  These 
measures are desirable only if returning migrants are encouraged to return by 
the tax incentives and if returning migrants actually contribute to the 
development of their home countries. 
Finally, transactions between the emigrants to developed countries and 
those “left behind” could also be encouraged by the developed countries.  Tax 
breaks to businesses investing in developing countries may be the most 
obvious of these measures.  Needless to say, this section merely raised some 
options for action, yet a more focused analysis of these options and better 
empirical study of the brain drain phenomenon itself are required if one were 
to make firm policy recommendations. 
 
